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Abstract 
The Great Transformation of modern capitalism from the 1980s is the commodification of 
monetary/financial rules and related regulation. Assuming that free markets result in social optimum, 
financial liberalization has transformed public regulatory mechanisms into private self-regulation systems 
relying on market price-directed contractual schemas. In light of the 2007-08 crisis, this article seeks to 
question this blind faith in the market’s self-adjustment capacity. It argues that free markets and 
individual rationality-based economic efficiency cannot result in social harmony. It maintains that 
financial stability should not be entrusted to the vicissitudes of markets. It then suggests the 
decommodification of financial supervision through alternative public regulation that seeks social-
stability and economic viability.  
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1. Introduction 
Capitalist society evolves through continual cycles of commodification, exposure of 
human life and its dynamics to market mechanisms. The new millennium is the 
culminating point of this evolution since most of social rules and aims are shaped and 
evaluated according to decentralized free markets efficiency criteria. This is the 
dominance of market forces (marketization and commercial value creation process) 
over the whole society. In this general evolution, one specific but crucial aspect of “great 
transformation” of modern capitalism from the 1970s-1980s is the entire 
commodification of monetary and financial rules2 and related regulation through the 
process of financial liberalization and market friendly (de)regulation. This process has 
transformed public institutions-led regulatory mechanisms into private self-regulation 
systems (internal self-assessment and external advising and rating agencies) that rely on 
market price-directed contractual schemas. The main argument in favor of such a 
structural evolution is the belief in the efficiency of free market mechanisms to make 
society able to reach social optimum thanks to non-coordinated individual decisions and 
behavior. In this line, economic efficiency is assumed to lead to social efficiency. So, in 
light of the 2007-08 crisis and its catastrophic consequences for society, it seems to be 
relevant to recall the neo-liberal blind faith in free market’s self-adjustment capacity 
that let the core of capitalist society (money and financial markets) be commodified 
through the privatization of regulatory rules and commodification of supervision and 
intervention mechanisms. To deal with this issue, this article will liberally draw upon 
the seminal work of Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (1944)3.  
In this aim, the second section assesses the relevance of the major statements in favor of 
financial liberalization and of commodification of financial regulation in the working of a 
market economy. The third section shows that contrary to liberal axioms of market 
efficiency, there is no bridge between the so-called rational individual behavior 
efficiency and social efficiency. Free markets and individual rationality-based economic 
                                                          
2 Even though it belongs to the same process, the neutralization of monetary policies and central banks following the rational-
expectations-based New Classical assertions of efficient and equilibrium-led markets will not be studied in this article. However, it is 
worth noting that Polanyi (1944: 74) remarks that “self-regulating market demands nothing less than the institutional separation of 
society into an economic and a political sphere. Such a dichotomy is, in effect, merely the restatement, from the point of view of 
society as a whole, of the existence of a self-regulating market”. 
3 Kindleberger (1974: 45) notes that “Some books refuse to go away. They get shot out of the water by critics but surface again and 
remain afloat. The Great transformation by Karl Polanyi doesn’t exactly refuse to go away, but it was slow in arriving and it has kept 
on coming”. 
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efficiency cannot result in social harmony. Furthermore, it is argued that micro-relevant 
decisions often result in macro-catastrophic outcomes. The fourth section then 
advocates that in order to stabilize financial folly and put capitalist economies on a 
socially consistent evolution path one must stop the process of whole commodification 
of financial relations and then decommodify financial control and supervision 
mechanisms. An expected alternative direction is toward public regulatory mechanisms 
that could be related to collective development objectives and then seek “social-stability 
and economic viability” in the aim of attaining a socially satisfactory level of economic 
activity. The last section concludes that the lessons which could be drawn from this 
analysis can also hold for every area of human life, like the environment, health, 
education, etc. which should not be left to the vicissitudes of market-prices 
commodification mechanisms. 
2. Commodification of financial regulation 
Financial liberalization is a normal evolution of market capitalism since market 
economy is defined according to some rules stating that the organization and working of 
the economy must rest on free market mechanisms. This gives a specific society:  
“Market economy implies a self-regulating system of markets; in slightly more 
technical terms, it is an economy directed by market prices and nothing but market 
prices. Such a system capable of organizing the whole of economic life without outside 
help or interference would certainly deserve to be called self-regulating. These rough 
indications should suffice to show the entirely unprecedented nature of such a venture 
in the history of the race” (Polanyi, 1944: 45). 
The process of financial liberalization coincides well with the process of generalized 
commodification of human activities and relations in market economies. Most specific 
societal relations (health, education, solidarity, etc.) are directly (through privatization 
process) or indirectly (through the withdrawal of public agencies and entrusting of their 
activities to non-governmental but private-initiative-related entities seeking or not 
direct profit) are left to no-publicly/collectively organized groups or institutions. 
Explicitly or implicitly, this results in marketization of decisions, strategies and related 
activities which were not previously in the sphere of economic activities. The 
commodification process is at the heart of the market economy. It is through the 
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commodification that the market subordinates everything to its rationality and 
efficiency criteria and gives them the veil of independence of all moral criteria: “It is with 
the help of the commodity concept that the mechanism of the market is geared to the 
various elements of industrial life. Commodities are here empirically defined as objects 
produced for sale on the market; markets, again, are empirically defined as actual 
contacts between buyers and sellers” (Polanyi, 1944: 75). 
Van der Zwan (2014) points to the exponential growth of financial markets and to the 
financialization of everyday life in the new accumulation regime of modern capitalism 
while Lohmann (2012) maintains that the evolution of market societies results in two 
major phenomena: - the increasing privatization and marketization of public goods and 
of the state and its functions; and – the increased economic and political dominance of 
finance since the 1970s. 
Such phenomena have been already observed in the evolution of capitalism in the last 
centuries by Polanyi (1944: 60) who maintains:  
“Ultimately, that is why the control of the economic system by the market is of 
overwhelming consequence to the whole organization of society: it means no less than 
the running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded 
in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system. The vital 
importance of the economic factor to the existence of society precludes any other result. 
For once the economic system is organized in separate institutions, based on specific 
motives and conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a manner as to 
allow that system to function according to its own laws. This is the meaning of the 
familiar assertion that a market economy can function only in a market society.” 
Roughly speaking, the whole life becomes a large market where everything may be sold 
and bought among voluntary free individuals if there is a complete and perfect property 
right distribution allowing incentives for profit to push individuals toward egoist 
strategies that would result - by the magic of invisible hand (the gravitation of market 
prices around the equilibrium prices) – in social harmony and efficiency. Arguments in 
favor of such an assertion rest on the economic rationale of free market prices and on an 
“emotional faith in spontaneity” (Polanyi, 1944: 35). Like in the period analyzed by 
Polanyi, the “evangelical fervor of the liberal creed” was evolved, also in the last decades 
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of the 20th century, into a “veritable faith in man’s secular salvation through a self-
regulating market” (Polanyi, 1944: 141). The new financial organization of capitalism 
was indeed encouraged by the assertion that deregulated/free financial markets could 
lead the economy to a general equilibrium without structural public interventions and 
prudential regulation. 
In this generalized liberalization process all around the world, finance has shown an 
extraordinary “amphibious capacity” to bridge the gap between the political and the 
economic organization of the age, as it was the case also in the second half of the 19th 
century as stated by Polanyi (1944: 15). Polanyi (ibid.: 145-147) then emphasizes the 
central role played by public administrations in the establishment of a new economic 
order in the 19th century. Helleiner (1995) and Ülgen (2015a) also state that the late 20th 
century liberalization process has been supported by deliberate state decisions.  
Indeed Greenspan (1997) argues that the relevant regulation must rest on private 
sector’s risk management systems through mechanisms of incentives (as accountability, 
compliance and disclosure of information) to let banks and financial intermediaries to 
foster financial innovation without suffering from restrictive prudential rules. The 
liberal Gramm-Leach-Bliley act of November 1999 which replaced the restrictive Glass-
Steagall act of 1934 is a good illustration of this political direction. In the same vein, the 
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 put derivative market activities out of 
the regulatory interferences arguing that this would better incite market actors to 
diversify their engagements against risks and thus reduce the costs of access to the 
capital market (Quinn, 2009). It is supposed that open and liberalized markets would 
widen financial activities, enhance competition and then allow banks to diversify their 
risks. Enlarged strategies of rational agents are considered as the most effective means 
of allocation of resources and protection against shocks in the economy (Ülgen, 2015a). 
It is maintained that banking systems with more restrictions on banks' activities and 
barriers to entry are more likely to suffer systemic banking distress (Beck et al. 2006). 
Such a theoretical and policy perspective is at the core of deregulatory policies which 
framed a new institutional regulatory environment in which financial stability is 
entrusted mainly to market mechanisms. Hence, micro-prudential mechanisms (which 
are more decentralized and private control practices) replaced macro-prudential public 
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regulation. Financial regulation is therefore commodified since it is left to private rating 
agencies and to internal self-assessment models of banks themselves to take care of 
systemic stability through market operations. These operations, resting on the usual 
process of market-pricing related production of services and information, generated 
oligopolistic private-regulation markets dominated by powerful rating agencies. Those 
agencies then set the tone in financial markets but also in the financing conditions of 
public debts in international markets. The need of global regulation is assumed to be 
satisfied by decentralized procedures of self-regulation which should be related to 
market incentives, supported by market-friendly institutions.  
As pointed out by Ülgen (2014), the recommendations of the Basel Committee, from 
1988 with Basel I’s Cooke ratio, through 2004 Basel II’s McDonough ratio, till today’s 
after-2007 crisis Basel III’s regulatory “reforms”, encourage prudential arbitraging of 
financial actors and various internal rating procedures such as Internal Rating Based 
(IRB) and Rating Agencies’ regular announcements about the soundness of banks, 
financial intermediaries (including rating agencies themselves!) and innovated products 
and processes. This institutional framework is an incentives-based regulatory structure 
that relies on rules of transparent management that must improve the disclosure of 
information about the characteristics of products and involved establishments. In search 
for solid reputation, banks and agencies would be incited to more responsibility and 
produce reliable information for investors, reducing the need for public regulation –
assumed to impede markets efficiency by limiting freedom of action and imagination of 
private actors-, financial crises being mainly thought as some unpredictable accidents. 
The theoretical foundations of this new organization rely on the well-known paradigm 
of complete and efficient markets according to which the problem of instability is only 
conceivable under the hypothesis of exogenous shocks that are treated as some minor 
frictions at systemic level. This hypothesis of complete markets constitutes the 
conceptual background of the faith in the efficiency of markets and in the relevance of 
liberal economic policies (Ülgen, 2015a). The question of insolvency and illiquidity are 
put only marginally with regard to these frictions. It is supposed that free markets and 
market prices contain self-regulating / self-adjustment mechanisms to produce 
necessary and sufficient information and direct effectively the behavior of decentralized 
actors towards equilibrium decisions.  
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So, self-regulation relies on two erroneous beliefs:  
- There would be no conflict of interest between (private) regulators and (private) 
regulees (evaluated actors) when the assessment of the activities of the latter by the 
former is resting on supply-demand related (commodified) market relations; 
-  Private agencies’ assessment at individual level would suffice to guarantee system-
wide safety of market operations of separate and decentralized actors. 
However, those assertions seem to be invalidated by the 2007-2008 financial crisis that 
involved the rating and rated agencies and banks which had been declared, just some 
hours before the crisis, the healthier actors of the market! Several arguments might be 
used to understand the weaknesses and inconsistencies of such assertions with regard 
to the very characteristics of capitalist economies. Generation of conflicts of interest 
between regulators and regulees, informational asymmetries and/or uncertainty 
dominating financial markets and making decentralized private decisions error-prone, 
market coordination failures without collective organization, fallacy of composition and 
absence of bridge between individually rational behavior and macro-economic stability 
are some of them; but only the latter will be developed in the following section.  
3. No bridge between individual efficiency and social optimum 
The dominant regulatory system leaves the care of correcting possible failures of market 
mechanisms to market mechanisms themselves! The efficiency of such a mode of 
regulation is extremely reduced since there is no immediate and obvious way or 
transition from individuals to society or from individual rationality to societal 
consistency. Contrary to liberal axioms of market efficiency, there is no bridge between 
the so-called rational individual behavior efficiency (individual maximization process) 
and social efficiency (social optimum). Free market mechanisms and individual 
rationality-based economic efficiency cannot result in social harmony and micro-
relevant decisions often result in macro-catastrophic outcomes. 
On the one hand, the stabilizing capacity of decentralized self-regulation models is 
extremely limited because they cannot have a long-term macroeconomic vision over the 
entire evolution (authentic uncertainty that dominates the market economies). On the 
other hand, they cannot consider the interconnectedness among private actors since 
they have no knowledge about the future and the whole world but through probability 
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models that include crises as exogenous white noise! The interconnectedness is a 
macroeconomic matter while self-regulation looks only at micro-consistency and does 
not include, by definition, a mechanism of systemic macro-regulation. Players have no 
capacity to consider their mutual interdependences in their internal evaluations because 
those interdependences have a macroeconomic nature while the models of individual 
evaluation do not include, by definition, mechanisms of systemic regulation.  
The capacity of the market to assure the necessary coordination among individual 
decisions in case of stress is undetermined. The lack of long-term macroeconomic vision 
makes the mechanisms of spontaneous coordination unable to be positively reactive in 
case of generalized stress. When some (local or individual) disruptive events occur and 
then push the financial system towards a critical zone of instability such as the control of 
macroeconomic evolution becomes difficult and disequilibria propagate into the whole 
economy, the systemic risk enters the picture. Liberalized financial environment allows 
banks to undertake various innovations through monetary and financial networks that 
create strong linkages and interdependence among different actors (individuals, groups, 
institutions, countries). Therefore, individuals’ decisions and actions (microeconomic 
behavior) become liable to generate multilateral and multilevel effects such as in period 
of uncontrollable disturbances chain reactions in numerous markets may suddenly 
occur independently of previous expectations of economic agents about future economic 
evolution.  
A major concern in the working of markets is the confusion between micro-rationality 
and macro-consistency of economic decisions. The usual models of risk and crisis which 
are the formal references of the dominant regulatory schema do not take into account 
the linkages and interdependence among actors’ decisions in markets (these decisions 
are assumed to follow a Gaussian normal distribution). Hence micro-prudential 
regulation and macro-prudential supervision are confused. The result of such a 
confusion is the fallacy of composition which points to the incompatibility between 
micro-rational individual behavior and macro-consistent working of decentralized 
markets4. Applied to financial markets, this principle means that the microeconomic-
                                                          
4 The fallacy means that the sum of rational individuals does not obviously result in a system which would 
be rational. In other words, the individual efficiency of micro-rational decisions and the societal efficiency 
of the whole economic system do not mean the same thing. 
9 
 
individual safety of banks and financial intermediaries does not guarantee a sound and 
stable financial system. Indeed, when an establishment perceives an increase of risks 
related to its commitments, its rational behavior would usually consist in reducing its 
exposure by undoing its engagements. This individual (rational) behavior, when it is 
widened to a large number of establishments in the market, will be transformed into a 
crisis of illiquidity and a possible subsequent panic will make numerous debtors and 
creditors insolvent; the market horizon being reduced at the present immediate moment 
and actors taking place on the same (short) side of the market5. Micro-prudential 
regulation deals only with the exposure of individual establishments at risks and their 
microeconomic capacity to face them. They do not integrate endogenous risks or do not 
take into account directly the effects of individual difficulties on the rest of the system. 
They naturally neglect the implications of interconnectedness between individuals and 
macro dynamics and the limits of individual actors’ capacity to face the consequences of 
imbalances at macroeconomic level.  
Micro-prudential regulation is about variables which concern directly individual risks of 
banks and other financial institutions whereas macro-prudential regulation looks at the 
factors which affect the stability of the financial system in the whole. A critical 
component of the macro-prudential regulation is to understand the mechanisms able to 
counterbalance the effects of the reduction in risk perception by markets in period of 
expansion and those of the increase of risk in period of contraction. The basis of macro-
prudential regulation is that financial actors - who can follow individually careful 
strategies - can collectively generate systemic concerns. Systemic problems are mainly 
the cumulative results of individual actions that imply collective actions since 
individuals’ capacities are limited to their own interests and micro knowledge. However 
the mechanisms of self-regulation oust the necessary questioning about the conditions 
of global viability of monetary systems. This latter relies on some macro-warning 
mechanisms that must be supported, supervised and implemented through macro-
system-wide lenses and then collective rules. Furthermore, as systemic problems 
resolution generates social advantages which are superior to private advantages and as 
                                                          
5 The failures of Northern Rock in England in 2007 and Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers in the United 
States in 2008 are some recent cases related to this kind of systemic problem. 
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every private individual unit would benefit from the resolution of such problems even if 
she/he does not contribute to any effort by her/himself, the reduction of system-wide 
threats requires an enforceable system-wide regulation. Such regulation is obviously 
related to two principles. First, monetary/financial stability has a peculiar status as a 
kind of specific collective good as it concerns the whole society and its viability 
conditions. And second, monetary/financial stability cannot be “produced/consumed” 
according to decentralized and anonymous market mechanisms but calls for public 
intervention that must play the role of referee and stand outside of the private market 
relations in order to organize, supervise and regulate capitalist monetary and financial 
system (Ülgen, 2014). 
4. From liberal folly to social consistency: decommodifying financial supervision 
Even a market economy based society is framed through collectively-designed societal 
institutions. When the market is left to its own vicissitudes and market-framing public 
institutions are transmuted into passive agencies following the neoliberal doctrine, the 
result is often a social catastrophe. Polanyi (1944: 3) wisely notes that the philosophy of 
self-regulating market is a social innovation which gives rise to a specific civilization. But 
he argues that such an idea is nothing but a stark utopia since “Such an institution could 
not exist for any length of time without annihilating the human and natural substance of 
society (…)”. 
Minsky’s endogenous financial instability hypothesis may offer a relevant analysis to 
understand the above assertion of Polanyi as it shows how a capitalist market economy 
operates. Minsky (1986) announces the fundamental propositions of this hypothesis 
through two features: capitalist market mechanisms cannot lead to a sustained, stable-
price, full-employment equilibrium, and serious business cycles are due to the financial 
attributes that are essential to capitalism. Minsky (1982, p. 66) then states that 
capitalism is naturally unstable:  
“Stable growth is inconsistent with the manner in which investment is 
determined in an economy in which debt-financed ownership of capital exists, and the 
extent to which such debt financing can be carried is market determined. It follows that 
the fundamental instability of a capitalist economy is upward. The tendency to 
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transform doing well into a speculative investment boom is the basic instability in a 
capitalist economy.”  
The neoliberal economics is barking up the wrong tree because the devil is not the 
public intervention in the economy but the uncertain and irresponsible operating way of 
unorganized/unsupervised short-termist and speculative markets. Neoliberalism “goes 
astray” when it religiously asserts that to prevent state from having a stranglehold on 
the economy one must liberalize the whole economic relations and institutional 
infrastructure. The ad hoc underlying assumption is that the main institutions that 
would inevitably lead the system to a state of rest characterized by social 
optimum/equilibrium would be the free markets. So, in a society, institutions and the 
regulatory system have two aims: - Providing individuals with a general frame of action 
in society and – Prodding individuals and markets into implementing actions which are 
consistent with systemic stability and societal viability. Regulation is not, at least in its 
prime aim in democratic societies, to lock individual initiatives and human freedom but 
to give them a positive and socially sustainable horizon of action. 
In order to stabilize capitalist economies’ financial folly and place economies on a 
socially-consistent evolution path one must put a halt to the process of whole 
commodification of financial relations and decommodify financial control and 
supervision mechanisms. In this regard, an alternative direction is through renewed 
relevant public regulation that could be related to collective development objectives and 
seek “social-stability and economic viability” by making finance “the servant not the 
master of society” (Helleiner, 1995: 151) in support of welfare creating and sustainable 
economic activities. 
Recalling the economy-wide liberal experience in the US in the 19th century, Polanyi 
(1944: 210) states that “(…) a self-regulating market system implies something very 
different, namely, markets for the elements of production-labor, land, and money. Since 
the working of such markets threatens to destroy society, the self-preserving action of 
the community was meant to prevent their establishment or to interfere with their free 
functioning, once established.”  
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The situation is today quite similar when one takes into account the preparation of the 
2007-2008 crisis and the subsequent global imbalances that threat the continuity of 
economic relations and the world’s peace as well:  
“As long as the mechanism of international capital movements and short credits 
functioned, no disequilibrium of actual trade was too great to be overcome by methods 
of bookkeeping. Social dislocation was avoided with the help of credit movements; 
economic imbalance was righted by financial means.  
In the last resort, impaired self-regulation of the market led to political 
intervention. When the trade cycle failed to come round and restore employment, when 
imports failed to produce exports, when bank reserve regulations threatened business 
with a panic, when foreign debtors refused to pay, governments had to respond to the 
strain. In an emergency the unity of society asserted itself through the medium of 
intervention” (Polanyi, 1944: 215-216). 
From this perspective, a relevant alternative approach must put the emphasis on the 
malfunctioning of free/unconstrained markets. Market mechanisms reveal to be unable 
to allow private agents to adopt macro-consistent behavior; in a private-property based 
society, they only serve as a means of giving individuals more freedom space in their 
economic relations but they cannot organize their lives in society even in economic 
terms. Therefore, rightly structured and oriented public regulatory and supervision 
agencies become a prerequisite to directly monitor and discipline banks and financial 
institutions in order to improve macro stability in the economy. From this perspective, 
the stability of the financial system is a “public good” which must be produced and 
managed through macro-regulatory frameworks (Ülgen, 2015b).  
In this line, it seems to be possible to point to some regulatory policy implications for 
systemic stability through the opposition between micro-prudential regulation and 
macro-prudential supervision studied above. In a micro-prudential schema market 
incentives fail to prevent short-sighted individual behavior which often develops 
macular degeneration reflecting the very limited horizon of decentralized private 
expectations and subsequent actions. This macular degeneration is permitted by new 
speculation-oriented financial products and processes that feed a new regime of 
(financial) accumulation based on the expected price rise of assets and transform the 
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financing relations into Ponzi structures à la Minsky. In face of those theoretical and 
political weaknesses, the alternative approach puts the emphasis on the failures of 
markets and neoclassical incentive mechanisms to deal with macro-stability concerns. It 
calls for powerful public regulatory and supervision agencies to directly monitor and 
discipline banks and financial institutions in order to improve macro stability and 
strengthen systemic viability. Minsky wisely argues that the central bank should use its 
monetary powers to guide the evolution of financial markets in directions that are 
compatible with financial stability in the longer run rather than improvise controls that 
put out fires but which allow the underlying market situation to remain unchanged6.  
Minsky (1982, p. 69) then states that: “in order to do better than hitherto, we have to 
establish and enforce a “good financial society” in which the tendency by business and 
bankers to engage in speculative finance is constrained”. The “good financial society” 
requires above all the decommodification of financial regulation and a society-friendly 
macro-prudential supervision to distinguish between two opposed activities: finance to 
produce and finance to speculate. 
5. Some concluding remarks 
The lessons which could be drawn from this analysis can also hold for every area of 
human life, like the environment, health, education, etc. which should not be left to the 
vicissitudes of market-prices commodification mechanisms since those domains are 
related to some macro (societal) concerns and do not really rest on individual rationality 
criterion. 
Asserting that market mechanisms are working well because life goes on through thick 
and thin is not a scientific position but an ideological belief that interprets the 
functioning of markets as a fast-moving coordination (Lindblom, 2001). It might be 
tempting to assert that market and government are complementary institutions but it 
would be also judicious to remark that the market is not a spontaneous “market 
                                                          
6 The well-known neoclassical incentives system argues that supervision mechanisms must encourage 
private monitoring of banks through sound contract enforcement systems. In case of fire, central banks 
and governments must intervene to calm down manic behavior. However, as the diagnosis of the crisis is 
not robust in this kind approach that fundamentally rests on the belief of well-working of free markets, 
the cure is not sustainable. Several years after their interventions and amazing amounts of money placed 
in rescue operations, capitalist finance still remains highly fragile and crisis-prone in 2015.  
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outcome” but a voluntary and conscious construction, historically shaped under the 
auspices of progressive enlightenment philosophy of the 17th and 18th centuries, from 
Bacon to Voltaire, challenging the dominant institutions of that time. It is not a magic 
natural mechanism but a human construction and it is subject to changes and reframing 
according to the objectives of dominant beliefs and ideologies. As Vogel (2007) states, 
markets are - in every institutional framework (liberal or interventionist) – embedded 
in their own specific matrix of policies and the evolution of markets or the market 
reform process is a complex political process that involves opposed ideas and interests.  
The role of economists in the late 20th century has been to make people believe that the 
market was an efficient technical device able to allow society to work in an optimal way 
without any political interference. The role of alternative economics in the early 21st 
century might consist in supplying a convincing analysis of the necessary 
decommodification of financial stability (and of some monetary and financial relations) 
in order to make better and sustainable the functioning of modern societies. 
Consequently, the stake behind the commodification / decommodification opposition 
seems to be very important. Bond (2006: 169) states that “If neoliberalism has burdened 
the earth with the monetization and commodification of everything, the future of 
progressive politics may well be the expansion of the philosophical strategy of 
decommodification”. 
In order to develop open societies without submitting them to the devastating 
consequences of recurrent monetary and financial crises which are open to large social 
and political turmoil, alternative economics have to make sustainable effort to untie the 
ideological straitjacket in which neoliberal economics and vested interests had locked 
modern societies and their institutional structure. 
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